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Equal Respect for Rational Agency
Michael Cholbi
The Kantian project in moral philosophy invariably confronts naturalis-
tic headwinds. But these headwinds have become stronger in recent 
years, thanks to a growing body of evidence indicating that human 
choice and attitude formation is subject to an array of biases that render 
much of what we think and do irrational—or at least, less than ideally 
rational. A full catalog of these biases is impossible here, but among the 
better established are that we are time-biased, fixating on immediate 
outcomes of our choices while discounting future gains or losses;1 that 
we assign greater significance to losses in well-being than we do to 
equivalent gains to well-being;2 that our choices are heavily influenced 
by the order in which alternatives are presented to us3 or by how those 
alternatives are described (so-called ‘framing effects’);4 that our choices 
are often swayed by striking and memorable examples rather than by 
the totality of evidence available to us (“availability heuristics”);5 and we 
tend to choose quickly and lazily, not bothering (for example) to 
 investigate alternatives to options that others have set as defaults for us.6 
In the economic idiom used by Cass Sunstein, these biases generate 
1 T. O’Donoghue, and M. Rabin, “Doing It Now or Later,” American Economic Review 89 
(1999): 103–24.
2 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” American 
Psychologist 39 (1984): 341–50.
3 William  D.  Perreault, “Controlling Order-Effect Bias,” Public Opinion Quarterly  39 
(1975): 544–51.
4 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice,” Science 211 (1981): 453–8.
5 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability,” Cognitive Psychology 5 (1973): 207–32.
6 Richard H. Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
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“behavioral market failures,” wherein our desires, preferences, or well-
being are not as fully realized as they would be absent such biases.7
For Kantians, such findings may seem troubling. For the heart of the 
Kantian moral outlook, in the eyes of many its contemporary defenders, 
is that we owe respect to rational agents on more or less equal terms. In 
the terms made famous by Kant’s Formula of Humanity, we owe equal 
respect to persons by dint of their ‘humanity’ or rational agency, and 
more specifically because persons possess the practically rational 
 cap aci ties to set ends for themselves and to select adequate means to 
those ends.8 The various choice biases identified in the psychological 
literature suggest these capacities are much wobblier than we tend to 
assume, particularly with respect to prudential or instrumental rational-
ity. Again, just to take one example: That we are subject to framing 
effects wherein our choices often vary in response to how risky options 
are described (we are more likely to reject an option described as having 
a 20% chance of failure than to reject that same option when described 
as having an 80% chance of success, for instance) suggests that the 
mechanisms by which we choose the means to our ends fail to track 
features relevant to the rationality of choice.
Admittedly, that we often choose irrationally does not entail that we 
are not capable of rational choice or that we are not, in some generic 
sense, rational agents. Nevertheless, if the picture of human psychology 
suggested by this body of research into choice bias is correct, then the 
Kantian claim that rational agency is entitled to respect appears to rest 
on a dubious picture of human nature. Why, critics might ask, ought we 
respect human agents for something that they are evidently not, i.e., 
rational choosers? At a more theoretical level, if rational choice seems to 
be the exception rather than the rule in human psychology, this calls 
into question the common strategy of assuming that we are rational 
choosers and then proceeding to accommodate deviations from norms 
7 Why Nudge?: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2014).
8 See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Berlin Akademie edition (1900–), 6: 392, and Christine 
Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity,” Kant-Studien 77 (1986): 183–202. ‘Humanity’ argu-
ably also includes the more general rational capacity to act on the basis of, and not merely in 
conformity with, principles or ‘laws’.
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of rational choice as ‘non-ideal.’ Kantianism instead emerges as a  suspect 
version of an ideal theory. For if human agents are systematically 
 irrational, then the thesis that we owe respect to human beings insofar 
as they are rational agents—or even just insofar as they are practically 
rational agents—might appear as credible as the theses that we are owed 
respect because we can run a four-minute mile or do long division in 
our heads. And if human agents vary widely in their ability to form 
 attitudes on rational grounds, then a fortiori, the Kantian commitment 
to equal respect is imperiled as well.
Kantians can respond to these findings of systemic bias in three ways. 
First, they might attempt to discredit the relevant scientific evidence. 
Second, they might grant these scientific findings accurately describe 
human psychology but deny that they are evidence of irrational biases. 
Third, they may concede that humans are subject to these irrational 
biases but deny that this necessitates jettisoning the Kantian project 
 altogether. They might, in other words, develop a theory that accommo-
dates these irrational biases, articulating how equal respect for rational 
agency can still be a candidate for a—or even, the—fundamental moral 
norm even if human agents are biased in these ways.
This chapter sets aside the first9 and second responses so as to develop 
what I hope will be a compelling version of the third. Section 1 clarifies 
the nature of respect and what would need to be true of rational agents 
in order for them to be owed equal respect. Sections 2 through 4 con-
sider three different alternatives for what the object of equal respect 
might be. According to the first alternative, respect is owed when agents 
satisfactorily exercise their rational agency. According to the second 
alternative, respect is owed because agents possess a minimal capacity 
for such agency. I argue in favor of a third alternative wherein the object 
of rational respect is our aspiration to govern our lives rationally. This 
third alternative encompasses the second inasmuch as individuals must 
have some minimal capacity for rational agency in order to be owed 
respect. But this capacity is not what justifies respect for rational agency. 
9 Though for a suggestive critique of the studies that purport to demonstrate such biases, 
see Stephen Poole, “Not so foolish,” Aeon, 22 Sept. 2014 (https://aeon.co/essays/we-are-more-
rational-than-those-who-nudge-us, accessed 16 Apr. 2018)
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Rather, our aspiration toward rational self-governance grounds equal 
respect. This aspiration functions as a regulative ideal, both presupposed 
and aspired toward in our deliberations about our choices and attitudes. 
Aspirational constitutivism best answers to the moral demands of equal 
respect for rational agency while acknowledging our apparently natural 
tendencies to irrational attitude formation and choice. In my conclu-
sion, I outline how standard Kantian approaches to addressing how the 
moral norm of equal respect for rational agency should account for 
imperfect rational agency have rested on a wrongheaded  meth odo logic al 
assumption, namely, that such imperfections represent de vi ations from 
ideal circumstances, such that they are to be addressed via a non-ideal 
theory modeled on an ideal theory that assumes no such deviations. I 
propose, in contrast, that a defense of equal respect for rational agency 
should be non-ideal at the ground level, such that equal respect is owed 
to imperfectly rational agents because of, rather than despite, such 
imperfections.
1. Respect and Equality
Central to any defense of equal respect for rational agency as a funda-
mental moral norm is the specification of exactly what notion of 
‘rational agency’ can best play the role of what Jeremy Waldron has 
called the “host property” that serves as the shared ground of basic 
moral status.10 The notions of respect and equality presumably constrain 
what sorts of property could play this role, so some preliminary remarks 
about respect and equality are necessary before we consider candidates 
for this property.
In order for respect to be owed equally to persons, respect must be 
grounded in, or directed at, some property they have qua persons. The 
respect in question therefore cannot be a form of esteem, or what 
Darwall famously called “appraisal respect,” the sort of respect that rests 
on a positive appraisal of someone due to contingent but admirable or 
praiseworthy attributes she has, such as a pleasant singing voice or 
10 One Another’s Equals (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 86.
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having three times been named salesperson of the year. Equal respect 
can only take the form of what Darwall called “recognition respect,” 
which manifests as a disposition to assign weight in one’s deliberation to 
some feature of a person qua person that in turn justifies guiding one’s 
conduct toward the person in light of that fact.11 Recognition respect is 
owed to those things with an inherently high or distinctive status, a sta-
tus “left over when you take merit away or set it aside.”12 Recognition 
respect is thus owed and can be rightfully asserted or claimed, but is 
neither earned nor deserved. Note that while variations in appraisal 
respect are calibrated to variations in individuals’ worthiness to be 
esteemed, recognition respect is not appropriately calibrated to any such 
variations because it is directed toward someone due to her inherent 
status. So long as a being has such a status, she is owed recognition on 
the same terms as anyone else with whom she shares that status. Hence, 
recognition respect is a candidate for the sort of respect grounding a 
norm of equal respect, whereas appraisal respect is not.
These remarks illustrate how the notion of equality constrains the 
property that might ground equal respect for rational agency. But how 
does respect itself constrain that property? Respect is one of the many 
evaluative attitudes we might take toward something or someone. What 
are its distinguishing features? To start, Harry Frankfurt highlights how 
the antithesis of respect, disrespect, feels like a denial of a person’s 
“nature.” To be disrespected is for others to treat a person as though “the 
person . . . is not what he actually is.”13 These remarks underscore how 
respecting something involves a recognition of, and a proper response 
to, that thing’s nature. Consider the etymology of ‘respect,’ literally, ‘to 
look again’ or to reconsider. “Respect,” Robin Dillon notes, “is a  particular 
mode of apprehending the object: the person who respects something 
pays attention to it and perceives it differently from someone who does 
not and responds to it in light of that perception.”14 When we disrespect 
a person, we fail to attend to whatever property is most central to them 
11 “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics, 88 (1977): 36–49.
12 Waldron, One Another’s Equals, p. 2.
13 On Inequality (Princeton UP, 2015), pp. 86–7.
14 “Respect,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 1.1 (https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/respect/, accessed 24 Mar 2018).
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or to acknowledge what they most fundamentally are. In many such 
 failures, our conduct toward them was instead oriented toward some 
other property, more incidental to their personhood, that likely had 
evaluative significance for us: that the individual is attractive or has 
 talents or resources useful in helping us secure our ends. As Rawls 
(echo ing Kant) has it, respect should directly determine “our will 
 without reference to what is wanted by our inclinations.”15
Equal respect does not require that persons be precisely equal with 
regard to those aspects of personhood that ground respect. Many 
 persons can be tall without being the same height, or musically talented 
without all being able to play the same instruments. Likewise, whatever 
property grounds equal respect need not be one that human choosers 
have to the same degree or in precisely the same form. Equal respect 
may well rest on a “range property,” a property realized, in typical human 
choosers, to a sufficient degree so as to exceed some threshold but that 
choosers individually exceed to varying degrees.16 Waldron offers a 
comparison to the property being in Scotland. Aberdeen and Glasgow 
both have this property, though Aberdeen is farther from Scotland’s 
“threshold” with England than is Glasgow.
Recognition respect, in my estimation, is just the kind of property 
that is likely to be rooted in a range property. For as Ian Carter has 
observed, this kind of respect requires prescinding from treating others 
on the basis of judgments, however well grounded, of precisely how 
fully realized or capably exercised their powers of rational agency are. 
Except for special contexts where our goal is to evaluate rational cap-
acity—a psychiatrist determining if an accused person is fit to stand 
trial, say—respect requires us to treat others as “opaque,” not ‘looking 
inside’ them in order to decide how they ought to be treated.17 In thereby 
taking another as ‘given’, we establish and honor the sort of distance 
between agents that, as Kant observed, is characteristic of respect.18 In 
15 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Barbara Herman (ed.) 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 153.
16 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 
1971), p. 444.
17 “Respect and the Basis of Equality,” Ethics 122 (2011), pp. 551–3.
18 MM 6:449. For further elaboration of Kant’s claim, see my Understanding Kant’s Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 65–6.
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this way, we take into account that respect is owed to anyone whose 
rational agency falls within the bounds set by the relevant range  property 
rather than tailoring our treatment of rational agents based on the 
degree to which they exceed those bounds.
Respect thus invites us to adopt of attitudes of deference toward 
 whatever is entitled to respect. Those entities meriting respect should be 
left essentially in the state they are, to enjoy a kind of intactness or 
 integrity. This applies not only to persons, but other entities that might 
be worthy of respect, such as extraordinary elements of the natural world, 
noteworthy artworks, or other human achievements. We respect Iguazu 
Falls, or the Magna Carta, or the Apollo XI lunar lander  principally by 
leaving them be. Those things meriting respect therefore ought not, 
without extremely compelling reason, be modified to fit our purposes. 
Respect thus does not ask us to change its object’s nature. Rather, it asks 
us to step back and revere that object for being essentially what it is.
These remarks about the nature of equality and respect suggest desid-
erata about the host property that might make sense of equal respect for 
rational agency as a fundamental moral norm. Let us now consider 
three candidates for such a host property.
2. Exercising Rational Agency
One possible gloss on respect for rational agency is that it should be 
understood as directed toward successful exercises of rational agency. 
On this picture, respect for rational agency requires that we defer to all 
and only those choices of others that are in fact practically rational. I 
will not advance a position here as to exactly what criteria an agent’s 
choices must meet in order to be practically rational. But on this picture 
of respect for rational agency, choices that do not meet those criteria 
need not be respected, which (as we saw in the previous section) means 
that they ought not be deferred to or viewed as authoritative.
The obvious advantage of viewing exercising rational agency as the 
grounds for equal respect is that it provides a straightforward and 
 credible rebuttal to the earlier worries about our tendencies toward 
 irrational choice. If so many of our choices are practically irrational, then 
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let us not respect those choices but instead reserve respect for that subset 
of choices (however minute) that satisfy the standards for practical 
rationality.
Exercising rational agency has little to recommend it, though, as a 
candidate for the property that might ground equal respect for rational 
agency. For one, it is likely to have strongly inegalitarian implications. It 
may be, as Bence Nanay19 has it, that we are all stupid. But it would be 
surprising if we were even roughly equally stupid. To ground respect in 
exercising rational agency is thus likely to accord such widely varying 
amounts of respect to agents so as not to recommend anything resem-
bling equal respect for them.
In addition, for equal respect to be directed at exercises of rational 
agency falls short of what seems to matter about respect. The yearning 
to be respected is, as the previous section outlined, a yearning that 
something essential about us be deferred to. Respecting our choices 
matters to us because they reflect something about us as choosers and 
valuers. Not respecting our choices is evidence that we are not respected. 
Yet to restrict respect to our rational choices rests on an unduly narrow 
conception of what we are. For us, rational agency is a causal, but not a 
mechanical, power: Our deliberation, habits, etc. shape our choices, and 
our choices in turn shape the intentions, desires, and other states that 
give rise to action. But at every stage of the exercise of rational agency, 
we are, as the choice bias literature reminds us, fallible creatures. This 
fallibility reflects the fact that our rational powers are normative as well 
as causal, susceptible to error rather than operating infallibly in accord-
ance with fixed laws. Respect for us as we are must therefore reflect this 
fallibility. So when our choices fail to satisfy standards for rational 
choice, this ought not be seen as a kind of malfunction akin to the fail-
ure of some non-agential physical system, as when a knife fails to cut or 
a computer fails to boot up. Failures of rational agency are still mani fest-
ations of rational agency understood as a normative power. To make an 
irrational choice is to manifest our natures while simultaneously failing 
19 “Stupidity is Part of Human Nature: Why We’re Better Off Giving Up the Myth of Perfect 
Rationality,” IAI News, 25 April 2018 (https://iainews.iai.tv/articles/why-stupidity-is-part-of-
human-nature-auid-1072?access=All%3Futmsource%3DReddit#__prclt=bjBFXCqG, accessed 
27 April 2018).
0004888160.INDD   189 7/10/2020   12:09:01 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 10/07/20, SPi
Dictionary: NOSD
190 Michael Cholbi
to live up to the demands established by those natures. Thus, if an 
 individual’s rational choice to do A is to be respected but her less than 
rational choice to do B is not, then that individual is not respected for 
the sort of rational agent she is. To say that the norm of equal respect 
requires ‘respecting’ only our rational choices is not to heed or defer to 
our rational agency on the basis of the kind of entity it is (i.e., an 
 imperfect normative power). Respecting only rational choices is thus to 
hold persons to a standard of respect inappropriate to the nature of the 
en tities they are. To the extent that satisfactory exercises of rational 
agency necessitate respect at all, they necessitate appraisal respect, not 
the recognition respect associated with respect for persons.
In sum, the very considerations that enable this first alternative to 
rebut the worries about irrational bias hamper its ability to undergird a 
norm of equal respect for rational agents. For grounding equal respect 
in exercises of rational agency rebuts those worries only at the cost of 
jettisoning both equality and respect.
3. Rational Capacity
A more orthodox Kantian gloss on respect for rational agency 
 understands it in terms of a capacity or set of powers. On this picture, so 
long as a choice is made by an individual minimally possessed of the 
powers of rational agency, then their choices are to be respected, even if 
those choices are substantively irrational as a matter of fact. Rational 
choices merit respect on this model, but so too do irrational choices 
if, counterfactually, the individual could have exercised her rational 
 capacities to choose rationally.
Grounding equal respect in rational capacities has a number of 
 dialectical advantages. It incorporates a genuine form of respect for 
rational agents, inasmuch as it requires others to defer to them even in 
instances of irrational choice and so recognizes their nature as beings 
possessed of normative (rather than purely causal) powers of choice. On 
the condition that the threshold for possessing the relevant rational 
capacities is not set unduly high, this alternative also avoids the inegali-
tarian implications that beset the previous alternative. Finally, grounding 
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equal respect in rational capacities holds promise in rebutting worries 
about systemic rational bias and thereby salvaging the Kantian moral 
project. For this alternative does not require that our choices be 
rational in order to be owed respect; rather, even choices influenced 
by all-too-human biases are owed respect if the agent had the capacity 
to choose differently.
While a capacity for minimally rational practical agency is necessary 
for equal respect, it is not, in my estimation, sufficient. To see why, 
imagine an intelligent robot-like machine, akin to Clarke and Kubrick’s 
HAL, equipped with powers of rational choice—at a minimum, the 
capacity for instrumental reasoning against some pre-programmed 
background of ends, say, self-preservation. It possesses the ‘cognitive’ 
firepower to identify sufficient means to some set of ends, and it is 
 programmed to be ‘committed’ to its ends or goals. Such a machine 
could weigh ends of immediate urgency against those of long-term sig-
nificance; could ascertain causal relations between particular courses of 
its action and its ends; etc. Assuming that its programming is adequately 
designed, such a machine would be highly efficient in its pursuit of 
its ends.
But would such an entity be entitled to moral respect from us, the 
kind of deference Kantians have in mind? Our question is not ‘first-
personal,’ i.e., whether such an entity could or would demand respect 
for others. Rather, our question is whether an entity with perfect instru-
mental rationality should be recognized as worthy of recognition 
respect. One reason for doubt is that this machine lacks one aspect of 
Kantian humanity, to wit, the capacity to set ends. While correct, this is 
not our strongest reason to withhold recognition respect from it. Rather, 
the instrumentally rational machine has no reason to care about whether 
its choices are rational. Our machine is not invested in its sole end of 
self-preservation in the way that we imperfectly rational agents are 
invested in our ends. Its choices make a difference to whether the 
machine survives, but whether it survives may not make a difference to 
the machine. If the machine can be said to have a ‘perspective’, it does 
not matter from its perspective whether it (or its choices) are respected.
We, on the other hand, wish to be respected as rational choosers. How 
come? For us, practical rationality is both a boon and a bane, a set of 
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normative powers that enables us to choose and to act, but a set of 
 powers that is fallible in that regard as well. To choose rationally is 
therefore an achievement for us20 in a way that it is not for a perfectly 
rational machine. Because rational choice is in varying degrees difficult 
for us, rational self-governance requires effortful exercises over time of 
our rational wills. To not respect us as rational agents is to overlook how 
our very fallibility as rational choosers provides the background  condition 
for us caring about our rational agency. Being imperfect, our rational 
agency matters to us because it establishes a problematic for us, as well 
as containing the seeds of the solution of that problematic. Our aspiration 
to choose rationally occurs against an awareness that our agency, being 
a normative power, sometimes fail. This awareness drives our aspiration 
to rational choice, as well as inducing anxiety about whether our choices 
are rational. A perfectly rational machine, in contrast,  suffers no anxiety 
about whether its choices (or its ends) are rational or not. They do not 
face choices that they view as puzzling, momentous, or pivotal. Practical 
rationality is not worrying for such a machine in the way it can be and 
often is for us; we aspire to be rational because our limitations, including 
our susceptibility to various forms of irrational bias in choice, make 
rational choosing an achievement for us.21 Rational choice thus solves a 
difficulty posed to us by our infallible natures, whereas in the robot’s 
case, its choices, while rational, do not address a challenge rooted in 
its nature.
Respecting a rational agent requires that they be an agent with 
rational capacities. Yet respect-worthy moral personhood thus requires 
more than the cognitive machinery of rational choice. Moral  personhood 
also necessarily involves a desiderative orientation, a disposition not 
only to rationally deliberate but to deliberate in ways evincing concern 
20 Gwen Bradford, Achievement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
21 Does the fact that respect for rational agents rests on their being imperfectly rational—
agents for whom rational choice is fallible and hence problematic—entail that that we ought 
not respect a perfectly rational God? This contention assumes that human respect for the deity 
is a form of recognition-respect, rooted in God’s nature. This appears plausible, since God’s 
nature (as it has been understood in the monotheistic faiths) as perfectly just, all-knowing, etc. 
is respect-worthy. However, I harbor doubts that respect for God is genuinely a form of recog-
nition-respect. For what we seem to respect about God is God’s perfect rationality, and indeed, 
as the persistence of the theological problem of evil might suggest, our respect or esteem for 
God appears to pivot on our appraisal of God as perfectly rational, etc.
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for the rationality of one’s choices. And only agents for whom rational 
agency is a tool—and the exercise of rational agency a task for which 
success is possible but not inevitable—can have such a desiderative 
 orientation. Hence, respect-worthy rational agents are not simply agents 
who can engage in rational choice. They are also agents for whom it 
matters to them, however inchoately, that they engage in rational choice. 
Whatever its powers of rational choice may consist in, in the absence of 
the machine being able to care about whether its choices are rational, 
such a machine would not be morally entitled to the sort of respect spe-
cifically owed to persons. We might appraisal respect their rational 
agency, esteeming or admiring its efficacy. But their rational agency is 
not something we need recognize as imposing moral constraints on how 
we engage with them.
To be worthy of respect as a rational agent, then, is not merely a meta-
physical matter. One must be able to be rational to be so respected. But 
respect for rational agency is properly directed at agents for whom 
rational agency is an aspiration.
4. Aspirational Constitutivism
Hence, on the view of equal respect for rational agency I favor, as pir-
ation al constitutivism, individuals must have some minimal capacity for 
rational agency in order to be owed respect, but this capacity is not the 
basis for respect. Rather, the ‘host property’ that serves as the object of 
respect is the aspiration to rational self-governance. We are imperfect 
rational agents, beings who can and do entertain, and occasionally puz-
zle over, questions about what to do, be, or become. Indeed, our lives are 
suffused with normative questions, not only Korsgaard’s normative 
question about the authority of morality, but a myriad of questions, 
some grand and others pedestrian, of practical import. It is not simply 
that such questions often feel unavoidable; after all, something must be 
done, and even deciding to ‘do nothing’ is a choice of sorts. Rather, we 
take these questions with varying degrees of seriousness and typically 
presuppose that they have right (or at least, better or worse) answers. In 
entertaining such questions, we evince our aspiration to choose rightly, 
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well, or properly—that is to say, rationally. Frankfurt captures how the 
aspiration resides near the core of our self-understanding:
. . . we are not prepared to accept ourselves just as we come. We want 
our thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to make 
sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas are formed haphaz-
ardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses 
or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate 
to believe that we are directing ourselves—in thoughtful conformity to 
stable and appropriate norms. We want to get things right.22
If aspirational constitutivism is correct, these same yearnings to “get 
things right” and for our “behavior to make sense” also undergirds the 
respect that compels others to take us seriously.
The aspiration toward rational self-governance is evident in regard to 
particular choices we must make. But it also arises in so far as we are 
called upon to make interrelated choices at various times. Circumstances 
can necessitate revisiting past choices or require that we choose now 
about what sorts of options, and hence what sorts of choices, will be 
available to us in the future. Past choices can be instructive about our 
ends, both how alternative ends sit with us and how they integrate with 
one another. Past choices can also be instructive about which means best 
serve the ends to which we are committed. For beings like  ourselves, 
equipped with powers of memory and anticipation as well an awareness 
of time’s elapsing, being a rational agent is thus an ongoing, kinetic 
undertaking. The aspiration to rationally govern one’s life is hence not 
(or not merely) a desire to govern this or that choice rationally. It is the 
aspiration to govern our biographies rationally over expanses of time—
at its limit, over the entirety of one’s lifespan. The aspiration to govern 
one’s life rationally thus has duration because we live temporally 
inflected lives.
This aspiration is closely related to what George Sher called “effective-
ness.” Each of us, Sher argues, is a distinct subjectivity linked to past 
22 Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
2006), p. 2.
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and future events. We thus have a “fundamental interest” in rationally 
 organizing our lives diachronically so as to live a life that “is future 
 oriented, active, reason-guided, and organized around an enduring 
though evolving set of aims”23 that shift in response to contingen-
cies. I propose that in “assessing the reasons with which one’s evolving 
 situation provides one, forming and pursuing aims, intentions, and 
plans that reflect those assessments,”24 we betray the implicit aspiration 
for rational self-governance that is the proper object of respect.
In many respects, rational agency functions as a regulative ideal for 
imperfectly rational agents such as ourselves. For Kant, regulative ideals 
(such as the unification of the sciences) establish an agenda for a given 
practice or inquiry. A regulative ideal animates a practice inasmuch 
those participants in the practice assume that the ideal is achievable 
through that practice without having decisive theoretical evidence of its 
achievability. A regulative ideal thus represents an aspiration presup-
posed in some practice of inquiry. Practical rationality, I hypothesize, 
ought be respected because success in practical choice serves as a de 
facto regulative ideal in the practical realm: We assume that our choices 
both do and ought to conform of standards of practical rationality—and 
upon learning that some of our choices do not, we do not relinquish this 
ideal but wish to better realize it.25
Before turning to the advantages of aspirational constitutivism as an 
account of the property that grounds the moral norm of equal respect 
for rational agency, let me address two immediate worries.
First, it may just seem odd that a particular attitude itself, rather than 
some more generic feature of rational agency, could be the property that 
explains why rational agency ought to be respected. But it is not so odd. 
Recall that respect is directed at properties that reside near the heart of 
the respected entity’s nature. If the aspiration for rational self-governance 
is part of our nature, then it is hard to see why it could not be a 
 candidate for the property that grounds respect for persons. Keep in 
23 Equality for Inegalitarians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 95.
24 Equality for Inegalitarians, p. 96.
25 For more on how regulative ideals can play a role in the practical realm, see my “The 
denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 
(2016): 268–89.
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mind that the proposed object of respect is not the successful realization 
of this aspiration but the aspiration itself. And that aspiration survives 
even when we fail to realize it.
Second, is it part of our nature? No doubt the aspiration toward 
rational self-governance is apparent in the classic ‘type A’ personality. 
But what of the type B’s, who only infrequently reflect on their choices, 
are more ‘in the moment’ and content ‘to live and let live’? Can we really 
say that (for instance) the individual in Kant’s third illustration of the 
Categorical Imperative, a slacker-like figure willing to let his talents rust 
rather than be diverted from his immediate pleasures, aspires to live a 
rational life?
Clearly, if human agents share this aspiration, they are not equally 
zealous or deliberate concerning this aspiration. But it is not part of 
aspirational constitutivism that individuals be self-conscious of this 
aspiration or that it be part of their explicit self-conception. Indeed, for 
most of us most all of the time, the aspiration toward rational self-
governance operates, as I have said, as a regulative ideal, an aspiration 
that largely goes unnoticed as it operates in the background of deliberation 
and choice. Of course, when we deliberate and choose overtly, this as pir-
ation moves to the foreground, revealing itself whenever we consciously 
entertain questions about what we should choose or do.
Thus, not recognizing oneself as having this aspiration does not 
 demonstrate one lacks it. Furthermore, the agent who denies that she 
aspires to rational self-governance presumptively has rational grounds 
for this denial—rational reflection quashes her spontaneity, impedes 
her unself-conscious enjoyment of various goods, invites us to see too 
much of our lives and circumstances as susceptible to our control, sets 
us up for regret when our rational choices do not pan out as we antici-
pated, etc. But note that this denial is not in fact a rejection of rational 
 self-governance, but an attempt to put reason in what the denier views 
as its proper place. It is not the renunciation of the aspiration to ration-
ally self-govern but an alternative rational appraisal of how reason is 
best put to rational use. The capacity for rational self-governance that 
undergirds the as pir ation to rational self-governance at issue is thus 
austere: the capacity to respond to reasons one does or could recog-
nize, not the capacity to live up to some more substantive norm(s) of 
rational choice.
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And I would therefore suggest that even the least proactive, reflective, 
or self-critical individuals nevertheless exhibit this aspiration in some 
measure. For in opting against a more rationally self-aware mode of life, 
these individuals tacitly take themselves to have reasons for doing so. 
They are staking out a position regarding the proper place of rational 
self-governance, and in so doing, showing themselves to be committed 
to the aspiration to rationally self-govern.
In the terms made familiar by Rawlsian political liberalism, the ques-
tion of where reason fits within one’s life is an element of one’s concep-
tion of the good, i.e., of one’s rational plan of life. And just as there is 
evidently reasonable pluralism about (for example) the place of religion 
or parenthood in a well-lived life, communities that respect rational 
agents equally can respect the diversity of ways in which individuals 
incorporate reason into their conceptions of the good. Equal respect for 
rational agency embraces maximizers and satisficers, hedonists and 
objectivists, type A’s and type B’s, planners and improvisers. Reasonable 
pluralism about  reason itself is itself reasonable. The proper place of rea-
son in life is therefore a question for reason, not one that questions rea-
son. Those whose self-imposed rational requirements appear comparatively 
undemanding  nevertheless have rational self-expectations and do not 
thereby reject rational self-governance. And the as pir ation to be ration-
ally effective is kinetic, but nothing mandates that it be frenetic.
Aspirational constitutivism achieves much of what the Kantian moral 
project seeks. The respect it recommends we owe to rational agents is 
rooted in a recognition of the kind of entity human beings are, namely, 
beings whose practical identities are intertwined with the aspiration to 
govern their lives on rational terms. It thus amounts to a form of respect 
directed at persons as such, rather than at their merits, accomplish-
ments, etc., or at particular choices that satisfy standards of rationality. 
Furthermore, aspirational constitutivism can vindicate the Kantian 
moral norm of equal respect for rational agents. For while individuals 
will vary in the degree to which they aspire to rational self-governance, 
aspirational constitutivism does not require that individuals satisfy 
some threshold of rational competence in order to be entitled to respect. 
Again, the aspirational constitutivism predicates respect on a normative 
attitude common to rational agents rather than on the skillfulness with 
which they put their rational agency to use.
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Aspirational constitutivism also carves the boundary between agents 
entitled to respect and other entities in a plausible way. Instrumentally 
rational machines lack the aspiration toward rational agency needed 
to ground respect, as do many non-human animals. Human agents are 
thus entitled to a presumption of equal respect but not for objectionably 
‘speciesist’ reasons. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of 
human choosers, even those ‘marginal cases’ with depleted or incipi-
ent rational agency, give evidence of this aspiration. Still, one might 
worry that aspirational constitutivism casts its net too narrowly with 
respect to which beings are owed respect as rational agents. Are there 
not  in di vid uals who (intuitively) we ought to respect but for whom the 
 aspiration to govern themselves rationally is psychologically “beyond 
them”? For example, might not those undergoing dementia lack this 
aspiration, and if so, does this entail that we ought not respect the 
demented?
Admittedly, some bullet biting may be in order here. A human indi-
vidual who either never has the ability to exercise rational agency or the 
aspiration to do so effectively would not, according to aspirational 
 constitutivism, be entitled to respect as rational agents. But as our dis-
cussion of respect in Section 1 illustrated, respect is not an attitude 
whose application is justifiably restricted only to rational beings. Respect 
is a more general stance of treating an individual or entity as having a 
kind of inviolable integrity. But this entails that what respect amounts to 
with regard to some individual or entity depends on the sort of individ-
ual or entity it is. What (say) an ancient redwood requires in the way of 
respect will differ from what a courtroom proceeding requires in the 
way of respect.26 In the case of demented or other psychologically 
 atypical human beings, they may be entitled to a species of respect that 
differs from the respect to which rational agents are entitled. It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to investigate what the former species of respect 
amounts to. Nevertheless, there may well be certain attitudes or 
 behaviors demanded of us insofar as we aim to respect human 
26 I explore what respect for non-human animals, despite their lacking the essential proper-
ties of Kantian rational agency, could look like in my “A Direct Kantian Duty to Animals,” 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (2014): 338–58.
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in di vid uals who do not satisfy aspirational constitutivism’s conditions of 
respect for rational agency.
Furthermore, note that the aspiration to which I have appealed is not 
the aspiration to make this or that choice on grounds one can find 
rational. Rather, it is the aspiration to rationally govern one’s life in its 
entirety. According to aspirational constitutivism, respecting agents’ 
particular choices is required because the object of respect is the person 
qua biographical agent, and their particular choices reflect their effort to 
rationally self-govern their lives. This picture is compatible, however, 
with individuals lacking, at certain intervals or stages in life, either the 
capacity for rational choice or the aspiration thereunto. A precocious 
child may aspire to make vital choices about her life but lack the cap-
acity to respond to reason. Conversely, a depressed person may have the 
capacity to respond to reason but lack the aspiration to choose, thanks 
to the motivational lethargy associated with their medical condition. 
But respect, as I conceive it, need not require that both of these be in 
evidence at a given moment in order for respect to nevertheless be in 
order. After all, the aspiration to have a rational biography overall can 
co-exist with intervals or stages in which that aspiration ebbs or the abil-
ity to pursue a rational biography is compromised. A rational biography 
is, in Sher’s terms, a rationally effective one, and realizing such a biog-
raphy may necessitate a kind of diachronic dexterity in the face of oscil-
lations in one’s capacity or motivation to rationally govern one’s life as a 
whole. But so long as a person’s biography contains spans in which this 
capacity or motivation is apparent, we may be required to respect them 
at times outside of those spans. So in the case of the demented individ-
ual, they may lack both the capacity and the aspiration in question. But 
suppose that such an individual had previously crafted a valid advance 
directive to be applied when her disease later renders her rationally 
incompetent. Ought this directive be honored, even if the demented 
individual opposes its being honored? Aspirational constitutivism does 
not justify its being honored by appealing to the authority of the earlier 
rational self over the later less rational self. We must instead look to 
which forms of treatment would best accord with her aspiration to live 
her life on rational terms. An advance directive is a purposeful attempt 
to realize that aspiration. As such, our honoring it typically validates 
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that aspiration, even though the object of our respect—the demented 
individual’s rational agency—is not present in the moment in which we 
are called upon to honor it.
Lastly, aspirational constitutivism is largely invulnerable to worries 
about systemic choice biases. Those worries have force against those 
views according to which respect for rational agents requires some level 
of proficiency in the exercise of rational agency. But aspirational 
 constitutivism grounds respect in an essential or constitutive attitude 
rational agents take toward rational choice—i.e., that they aspire to gov-
ern their lives on that basis—rather than in how successful they are as 
rational choosers. Hence, even if we are biased in the ways outlined in 
the psychological literature and so are unfortunately prone to exercising 
our rational powers suboptimally, this does not cancel our aspiration to 
use those powers effectively or render it unintelligible.
5. Exploring the Practical Implications  
of Aspirational Constitutivism
Before concluding, let us get a more determinate picture of what as pir-
ation al constitutivism practically entails. If respect for rational agency is 
respect for the aspiration toward rational self-governance, what does 
this morally require of us, and how might these requirements differ 
from those arising from the rival understandings of equal respect for 
rational agency that we have considered?
Aspirational constitutivism is well-situated to do what the moral 
norm of equal respect for rational agency does well, namely, capture the 
intuitive objectionability of deception, coercion, manipulation, 
 paternalism, etc. Such acts are objectionable, according to aspirational 
constitutivism, neither because they inhibit others from making rational 
choices nor because they fail to allow others to act on their rational 
capacities. These objectionable acts may well have these other features, 
but aspirational constitutivism will claim that they show disrespect 
because they do not recognize individuals’ aspiration to govern their lives 
on rational terms. When we deceive, coerce, etc., we inhibit others from 
pursuing or realizing their aspiration to choose and act rationally—in 
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light of their own ends, concerns, values, etc.—typically so that they will 
choose and act in ways that we believe better serve our ends (or in the 
case of paternalism, better serve their ends). Such actions thus usurp 
another’s aspirations and thereby treat their rational agency merely as a 
means. Aspirational constitutivism thus justifies the attitude toward 
rational agents that we earlier suggested resides at the heart of respect, 
namely, letting something be or honoring its integrity. Moreover, 
 aspirational constitutivism helps explain why rational persuasion is the 
morally ideal mode of influencing others’ attitudes. For rational persua-
sion enables others to pursue the aspiration to govern their lives  rationally 
while inviting them to engage in the very activity of rational deliberation 
that may enable them to realize that aspiration. Rational persuasion thus 
engages with, rather than undermines, the property that grounds respect 
for rational agents, their aspiration toward rational choice.
Aspirational constitutivism has the further advantage of explaining 
how respect for rational agency can justify positive duties to cultivate or 
enhance agents’ rational powers. For while some intercessions in others’ 
rational powers will fail to defer to them in the ways respect demands, 
intercessions that improve the effectiveness of rational agency can be 
justified by appeal to agents’ constitutive aspiration to govern their 
choices rationally over time.
Consider, for example, the contrast between nudges and what 
Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff call ‘boosts.’27 Nudges (for instance, using 
framing or ordering effects) exploit choice architecture to leverage our 
biases for our own presumptive benefit. Nudges will be morally worri-
some on aspirational constitutivism because they arguably manipulate 
choice through mechanisms that fall short of standards for rational 
attitude formation.28 Boosts, in contrast, recognize but do not exploit 
biases. Rather, boosts are interventions that improve competency over 
time and thereby reduce bias. Compare a classic example of a nudge, 
placing healthier foods in a dining hall at eye level in the expectation 
that in di vid uals tend to choose eye level items, with a boost, a cell phone 
27 “Nudging and Boosting: Steering or Empowering Good Decision,” Perspectives on 
Psychological Science 12 (2017): 973–86. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617702496
28 See Robert Noggle, “Manipulation, salience, and nudges,” Bioethics 32 (2018): 164–70.
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app that informs diners how many calories they have consumed to that 
point in a given day. The ‘nudger’ and the ‘booster’ have contrasting 
assumptions about the rationality of their targets: The nudger assumes 
her target is irremediably irrational and so justifies nudging as a way to 
take  advantage of that irrationality for the target’s benefit. The booster, 
on the other hand, sees the target’s rationality as malleable. ‘Boosting’ 
the rationality of the target’s choice does not just tend to make her 
immediate choices rational. It also assumes that her rational powers can 
be improved upon over time. Boosting thus seems morally preferable 
to nudging in a way that aspirational constitutivism can readily account 
for: A boost, unlike a nudge, respects an agent’s aspiration to guide her 
choices on rational grounds.
These remarks are admittedly sketchy. But they suggest that in add-
ition to the theoretical appeal of aspirational constitutivism in making 
sense of equal respect for rational agency, it may have practical appeal, 
vindicating our intuitive understanding of what such respect requires 
while also shedding light on harder cases where what respect requires is 
less obvious.
6. Conclusion
If aspirational constitutivism is correct, then human agents form a moral 
community anchored in the common endeavor of trying to govern their 
respective lives on rational terms. Respect among such agents does not 
necessitate their being paradigm practical reasoners, either in general or 
on particular occasions. For we can pay heed to an aspiration no less 
than to a capacity or to its successful exercise. In this regard, aspirational 
constitutivism has a more credibly Kantian pedigree than rival accounts 
of equal respect for rational agency. That moral and practical norms 
have roots in our nature as rational agents is a key Kantian claim. But it 
is all too easily misunderstood. Rational agency, on this Kantian picture, 
is presupposed not as a set of reliable causal powers we possess, but as a 
capacity that, because we are rational agents, we call upon ourselves to 
exercise in our choices and actions. In this regard, Kantian moral 
 phil oso phy has an aspirational pedigree: We imperfectly (or as Kant 
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would say, ‘finitely’29) rational agents nevertheless hold ourselves and 
others to rational standards even in full knowledge that failures to abide 
by these standards may be commonplace. But the aspiration to abide by 
these standards, I maintain, entitles us to respect.
Aspirational constitutivism breaks with much of the recent tradition 
in Kantian ethics in that it does not try to accommodate deficiencies in 
our practical rationality by developing a non-ideal theory modeled on 
an ideal theory that assumes no such deficiencies. Equal respect for 
rational agency, I have argued, instead presupposes such deficiencies 
inasmuch as the host property for such respect is a shared aspiration 
toward practical rationality. Under aspirational constitutivism, there is 
no need to develop a non-ideal theory. For non-ideal circumstances are 
written into aspirational constitutivism at a fundamental or ground 
level. Equal respect for rational agency simply is respect for imperfectly 
rational agents, with no need to adapt moral norms of equal respect to 
the ‘non-ideal’ circumstances of imperfect rational agents. In this regard, 
aspirational constitutivism marries the utopian and the realistic, so as to 
require neither that we compromise the former when addressing the 
 latter nor that we awkwardly attempt to address the latter as a degener-
ate case of the former.30 For we imperfectly rational agents are entitled 
to recognition respect because of our imperfections, not despite them.31
29 Critique of Pure Practical Reason, Berlin Akademie Edition (1900–), 5: 123.
30 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
31 A number of individuals provided valuable feedback and insights on earlier versions of 
this chapter, including audiences at a 2017 University of Manchester MANCEPT workshop on 
Moral Equality and Equal Respect, a 2018 colloquium presentation at Australian National 
University, the 2019 Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, and at the University of 
Saskatchewan. Particular thanks go to Arden Ali, Peter Alward, Christian Barry, Geoffrey 
Brennan, Brad Cokelet, David Copp, Helen Coverdale, Caleb Dewey, Robin Dillon, Giacomo 
Floris, Alexa Forrester, Sarah Hoffman, Pauline Kleingeld, Matthew Lindauer, Haley Mathis, 
Victoria McGeer, Dwayne Moore, Pierre-Francois Noppen, Emer O’Hagan, Philip Pettit, 
Carissa Phillips-Garrett, Costanzo Porro, Douglas Portmore, Wendy Salkin, Keshav Singh, 
Holly Smith, Nicholas Southwood, Ezequiel Spector, and Mark Timmons.
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